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Starting from Barnum’s recent proposal to use en-
tanglement and catalysis for quantum secure identification
[quant-ph/9910072], we describe a protocol for quantum au-
thentication and authenticated quantum key distribution. We
argue that our scheme is secure even in the presence of an
eavesdropper who has complete control over both classical
and quantum channels.
Since the publication of the BB84 protocol [BB],
quantum key distribution has developed into a well-
understood application of quantum mechanics to cryp-
tography. Typically, quantum key distribution schemes
depend either on an unjammable classical communication
channel or on authentication of the classical communica-
tion by classical methods. Comparatively little work has
been done on the problem of quantum authentication and
authenticated quantum key distribution.
Some existing quantum authentication proposals are
variations of the BB84 protocol [CS,HIB,DHHM]. These
proposals either require an unjammable classical channel,
or authentication of the classical communication using
classical cryptographic methods [DHHM]. An early pro-
posal [CS] uses quantum oblivious transfer, which has
since been shown to be insecure [L]. Some recent propos-
als [B,ZZ,ZG] are based on entanglement. A very inter-
esting protocol of this type is due to Howard Barnum [B].
In his protocol, the parties use a shared entangled pair of
particles as a catalyst [JP1] to perform a quantum oper-
ation which would be impossible without the catalyst. In
its original form, however, Barnum’s protocol has been
shown to be insecure [BK].
In this paper, we describe a protocol derived from Bar-
num’s protocol which appears to be secure against a wide
range of eavesdropping attacks. In a simplified version of
our protocol, the two parties, Alice and Bob, initially
share K particle pairs in an entangled state |c〉 (the key
or catalyst). Assume Alice wants to identify herself to
Bob. Bob then prepares K pairs of particles in an en-
tangled state |b〉 and sends one particle from each pair to
Alice (the challenge). It is possible [SJNP] to choose the
states |c〉 and |b〉 such that by using only local operations
and classical communication (LQCC), Alice and Bob can
convert the four-particle state |b〉|c〉 into the four-particle
state |c〉|c〉, but by using only LQCC, the two-particle
state |b〉 cannot be converted into the two-particle state
|c〉 deterministically. The state |c〉 thus acts as a catalyst
[JP1] for the conversion of |b〉 into |c〉.
Using a different catalyst for each pair of challenge
particles, Alice and Bob perform LQCC to convert all
K challenge pairs to the state |c〉. Bob now selects a
number K ′ of his challenge particles and asks Alice to
send back her corresponding challenge particles (her re-
sponse). For each of the K ′ challenge pairs now in his
possession, Bob makes a projective measurement onto
the state |c〉. An eavesdropper, Eve, pretending to be Al-
ice, would not have had access to the catalyst |c〉, so Eve
and Bob would not have been able to convert all their
challenge particles to the state |c〉, and therefore some
of Bob’s test measurements would fail. Below we will
derive an upper bound p0 for the probability p that an
eavesdropper remains undetected in a single such mea-
surement. The overall probability of not detecting an
eavesdropper is bounded above by pK
′
0 and can be made
arbitrarily small by choosing K ′ large enough.
After a successful authentication, Alice and Bob share
2(K−K ′) catalyst pairs, since the protocol requires that
they destroy the catalyst pairs used in the conversion
of the K ′ tested challenge pairs. If K > 2K ′, they now
share more key particles than before. Our authentication
protocol thus also provides authenticated quantum key
distribution.
The simplified version of our protocol just given is not
secure. Below, we first describe a full version of the pro-
tocol, and then we discuss a number of eavesdropping
attacks against it which we believe are the most pow-
erful such attacks. We will argue that our protocol is
secure even in the presence of an eavesdropper with full
control over both classical and quantum communication
channels; we do not, however, give a full security proof.
In our analysis, we assume that all quantum operations
are error-free and that the quantum channel is noiseless.
Choice of states. Consider bipartite states |b〉 =∑n
k=1
√
bk|k〉|k〉 and |c〉 =
∑n
k=1
√
ck|k〉|k〉, where the
states |k〉 are orthonormal basis states for one particle.
If b1 ≥ · · · ≥ bn and c1 ≥ · · · ≥ cn, then bk and ck are
called the ordered Schmidt coefficients of the states |b〉
and |c〉. The state |b〉 can be converted deterministically
into |c〉 using only LQCC iff the ordered Schmidt coeffi-
cients of the target state |c〉 majorize those of the initial
state |b〉 [N], i.e., iff ∀k : ∑ki=1 ci ≥
∑k
i=1 bi with equality
for k = n. Otherwise, only a probabilistic conversion is
possible [JP2,V].
States with the properties required for our protocol
exist for n = 5 [SJNP]. For n ≤ 4, the protocol needs
to be modified to use probabilistic entanglement-assisted
conversion [JP2]. Our choice of Schmidt coefficients for
|b〉 and |c〉 is b1 = b2 = 0.31, b3 = 0.30, b4 = b5 =
1
0.04, c1 = 0.48, c2 = 0.24, c3 = c4 = 0.14, c5 = 0.
With this choice, the conversion of |b〉 into |c〉 can be
done only with probability P (b → c) ≃ 0.572, but the
ordered Schmidt coefficients of the tensor-product state
|c〉|c〉 majorize those of the state |b〉|c〉, so the latter can
be converted into the former deterministically.
Even though the exact conversion |b〉 → |c〉 can only be
done with probability 0.572, it is possible to convert |b〉
to pure or mixed states ρ close to |c〉 with much higher
probability (we say that ρ is close to |c〉 if the fidelity
F = 〈c|ρ|c〉 is close to 1). By applying a theorem given
in Ref. [VJN], it can be seen that the average fidelity for
the conversion |b〉 → |c〉 is bounded above as
〈c|ρ|c〉 ≤ p0 ≃ 0.9907 , (1)
where ρ is now the average state resulting from the con-
version. The theorem also shows that the maximum av-
erage fidelity F¯ = p0 is achieved by a pure state |ξc〉 to
which |b〉 can be converted deterministically.
Overview of the full protocol. The main difference
between the simplified version of the authentication pro-
tocol given above and the full version is that the latter
is symmetric. In an authentication round, Alice and Bob
each establish the identity of the other part.
One round of the protocol consists of Alice and Bob
each preparing K particle pairs in state |b〉. Bob sends
one particle of each of his pairs to Alice; for these pairs,
Alice is called the prover and Bob the verifier. Likewise,
Alice sends one particle of each of her pairs to Bob; for
these pairs, she is the prover and he the verifier. Us-
ing a different catalyst for each pair, Alice and Bob now
convert each of the |b〉 states to a |c〉 state. Each of the
two asks the other to send back K ′ (K ′ < K/2) of the
new particles for testing; they abort the protocol if they
detect any particle pair not in the |c〉 state.
Eve, who does not initially share any entanglement
with Alice and Bob, cannot impersonate one of them
to the other. For a successful attack, Eve must there-
fore first obtain shared entanglement with Alice and Bob.
Below, after describing the protocol in detail, we discuss
its security against a number of attacks, where Eve has
full control over both the quantum and classical commu-
nication channels (such attacks are called “man-in-the-
middle” attacks).
The key. Before the first authentication round, we shall
assume that Alice and Bob share 2K particle pairs pre-
pared in the state |c〉: these are the catalysts, and to-
gether they form the key. With each successful authenti-
cation round, the number of key pairs increases. In each
round, the key particles used are labeled γiA and γ
i
B , re-
spectively, where i = 1, . . . , 2K, and the state of each
pair γiAγ
i
B is |c〉.
Detailed description. An authentication round con-
sists of the following steps.
1. Bob preparesK particle pairs βiAβ
i
B in state |b〉, where
i is odd, and sends βiA to Alice. These are Bob’s chal-
lenges. Likewise, Alice prepares K pairs βiAβ
i
B in state
|b〉 for i even, and sends βiB to Bob. Thus, for odd in-
dices, Bob will be the verifier; Alice will be the verifier
for even indices.
2. For each i, Alice and Bob perform the deterministic
catalysis conversion |b〉|c〉 −→ |c〉|c〉, where Alice per-
forms local operations on her particles γiA and β
i
A and
Bob performs local operations on his particles γiB and
βiB [N]. We can [LP] and do require that only the ver-
ifier performs both unitary transformations and gener-
alized measurements; the prover performs only unitary
transformations depending on the result of the verifier’s
measurements, which are communicated classically.
3. Alice picks randomly a subset QA ⊆ {2, 4, . . . , 2K} of
size K ′ of particles for which she is the verifier, and Bob
does likewise for a subset QB ⊆ {1, 3, . . . , 2K− 1} of size
K ′ for which he is the verifier. Bob as verifier now asks
Alice to send back her response βiA for some i ∈ QB. Bob
measures the projector |c〉〈c| on the particle pair βiAβiB.
If the measurement fails, he aborts the protocol. Then
Alice becomes the verifier, asks Bob to send βiB for some
i ∈ QA and tests it likewise. They continue taking turns
as prover and verifier until they have exhausted the sets
QA and QB. At the end of this step, they discard the
catalysts γiAγ
i
B for i ∈ QA ∪QB.
4. The authentication fails if any of the projective mea-
surements in the previous step fails, or if Alice or Bob
receive more than K ′ requests to send back challenge
particles.
5. If the authentication round succeeds, Alice and Bob
are left with 2(K −K ′) pairs γiAγiB and 2(K −K ′) pairs
βiAβ
i
B, i.e., they now have 2K − 4K ′ additional pairs in
the catalyst state |c〉. The 2K+n(2K− 4K ′) they share
after the nth successful round are now renamed γjAγ
j
B in
random order, i.e., with the indices j permuted using a
pseudo-random number generator.
Remark. If the authentication fails, the parties discard
all particles used till that point, including both the orig-
inal key and all new key pairs generated. In this case,
Alice and Bob have to start again with a new key. There-
fore, in practice they should initially share several sets of
2K key pairs.
Security and attacks. We now dicuss the security of
our protocol against a number of attacks. We start with
two simple attacks, impersonation and denial of service,
and then move on to more powerful “man-in-the-middle”
attacks.
Impersonation. Suppose that Alice is not present and
Eve tries to persuade Bob that she is Alice. When Bob
sends out a challenge particle, Eve intercepts it. We
therefore label it βE rather than βA, omitting the index i
for clarity. Eve must now perform local operations on βE
such that a later measurement by Bob on the pair βEβB
will fail with the smallest possible probability. If ρ is the
average state of the pair βEβB resulting from Eve’s and
Bob’s operations, then the probability that Bob’s mea-
surement succeeds is given by the fidelity 〈c|ρ|c〉. Since
Eve does not have the catalyst particle γA paired with
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the particle γB that Bob will use, the conversion is not as-
sisted by any entanglement. The fidelity 〈c|ρ|c〉 is there-
fore bounded above by p0 < 1 [see Eq. (1)]. Since in one
authentication round, Bob makesK ′ such measurements,
the probability of not detecting Eve is bounded above by
pK
′
0 , which can be made arbitrarily small by choosing K
′
large enough.
Denial of service. In this type of attack, Eve deliber-
ately causes the authentication round to fail, and hence
causes one party to discard all key particles. Although
our protocol in its present form is particularly vulnerable
to this kind of attack, this is not an essential weakness
since an attacker who controls both quantum and classi-
cal communication can always prevent successful authen-
tications between the legitimate parties.
Man in the middle. We now look at stronger attacks
in which Eve tries to obtain key material which she could
then use, e.g., in a later impersonation attack. Eve’s goal
is to share pairs of particles in the catalyst state |c〉 with
Alice and/or Bob. For instance, if she succeeds in ob-
taining a large amount of key material shared with Bob,
she will be able to authenticate herself to Bob without
Alice being present. Eve’s ability to obtain key mate-
rial is limited by the fact that if her presence is detected
in a single measurement, all the previously obtained key
material she shares with the verifier who performed that
measurement will become worthless.
We will distinguish between two kinds of attacks. In a
type I attack, Eve does not intercept the challenge particle
when it is sent from the verifier to the prover. In a type
II attack, she intercepts the challenge particle and sends
another particle on to the prover. Since the protocol is
symmetric, we will assume in the following that Alice is
the prover and Bob the verifier.
Type I attack. By definition, in a type I attack, Bob
sends the challenge particle βiA to Alice without Eve in-
terfering. Assume now that Bob sends out a request for
a response particle. Eve has three options. In option 1,
she passes the request on to Alice, then she passes Al-
ice’s response particle βiA on to Bob. Eve’s presence will
not be detected, but she does not obtain any key ma-
terial either. In option 2, Eve passes the request on to
Alice, then intercepts Alice’s particle and sends another
particle on to Bob. Eve does not gain anything, because
both Alice and Bob are going to discard their respective
particles. In addition, Eve risks detection with nonzero
probability.
Option 3 is the interesting one. Here, Eve does not
pass Bob’s request on to Alice. Instead she prepares a
pair of particles αE and αB in a state of her choice and
sends αB to Bob. Then she asks Alice to send back the
particle βi+2A , which is the next one for which Bob is the
verifier. Since the pair βi+2A β
i+2
B is in the state |c〉, Eve
now shares a perfect catalyst pair with Bob (assuming
that i+2 6∈ QB). Bob’s measurement on the pair αBβiB,
however, is going to detect her with a probability not less
than 1−p0. In the case that Bob’s measurement does not
detect her, we assume for our security analysis that, after
the measurement, the pair αEβ
i
A shared between Alice
and Eve is in state |c〉, which is probably too strong an
assumption. There is an additional risk of detection for
Eve in the next authentication round since, when Alice
and Bob relabel their particles in step 5 of the protocol,
there will be a j such that γjA is not entangled with γ
j
B.
Even if Bob does not ask for a response particle, Eve
may still send a request to Alice, so that again she ob-
tains a perfect catalyst pair with Bob. However, since
Alice will abort the protocol if she receives more than
K ′ requests to send back a response particle, Eve cannot
request a particle from her without also at some time
during the round sending a corresponding response par-
ticle to Bob. Therefore, Eve cannot avoid being detected
with a probability of at least 1− p0 for each key particle
she obtains in this way.
Type II attack. We now assume that Eve intercepts
the challenge particle βA sent out by Bob. As before,
because Eve now owns that particle, we will label it βE .
The pair βEβB is in state |b〉. Eve then prepares two
particles αAαE in a state |a〉 of her choice, keeps αE and
sends αA to Alice.
Unaware of Eve’s presence, Bob now goes through the
catalysis protocol with his particles βB and γB, where
γB is entangled with Alice’s particle γA. Bob sends out
the results of his generalized measurements, which Eve
intercepts. Bob’s two particles γB and βB are now in the
state
ργBβB = trγAβA(ργAγB ⊗ ρβAβB ) = trγAβA(|cc〉〈cc|) . (2)
This state is independent of Alice’s and Eve’s actions and
has no entanglement between the two particles.
At this point, there are three different cases. In the
first case, Bob does not request a response particle; Eve
thus does not risk being detected. She now shares entan-
gled states with both Alice and Bob. She can perform
arbitrary unitary or nonunitary local operations on her
particles αE and βE , and she can send fake measurement
information to Alice in order to influence Alice’s unitary
operations. For our security analysis, we assume that this
enables her to bring both pairs αAαE and βEβB into the
catalyst state |c〉, although it follows from the analysis of
case 2 below that she cannot reach this goal completely.
Eve may also ask Alice to send particle αA back to her,
but generally, Eve will not gain anything from this.
In the second case, Bob requests a response particle,
and Eve sends him her particle βE . We will now show
that the fidelity between the target state |c〉 and the
state ρβEβB on which Bob performs his measurement is
bounded above by 〈c|ρβEβB |c〉 ≤ p0, which implies that
Bob’s measurement fails with probability ≥ 1− p0.
The reason is that even if Bob collaborated with Eve
on maximizing the fidelity, they could only use LQCC in
the conversion; it would not be assisted by any entangle-
ment. Since Alice performs only unitary transformations,
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but no measurements, on her particles γA and αA, no en-
tanglement is created between αE and γB , which could
assist Eve and Bob in their task.
As in the first case, for our security analysis we will
assume that if Eve remains undetected, she shares pairs
in the catalyst state with both Alice and Bob. Eve can
get close to this goal by performing a type I attack against
Alice leading to a perfect catalyst pair shared with Bob.
Eve can do this because she has not passed Bob’s earlier
request on to Alice.
In the third case, Bob also requests a response particle,
but this time Eve passes his request on to Alice and inter-
cepts Alice’s response αA. Eve then performs arbitrary
operations on the three particles now in her possession,
αA, αE and βE . Then she sends one particle on to Bob.
We label this particle β˜E .
We now assume that Eve does not use any entangle-
ment to assist her in the conversion of the β particles,
which means that the fidelity between the target state
|c〉 and the state ρβ˜EβB on which Bob performs his mea-
surement is bounded above by 〈c|ρβ˜EβB |c〉 ≤ p0. This
implies again that Bob’s measurement fails with proba-
bility ≥ 1− p0.
The above assumption is rather strong, but partially
justified by the fact that there is a conflict of interest
for Eve: if Bob does not request a response particle, Eve
wants the α particles to be in the pure |c〉 state, in which
case they are not entangled with any other particle. For
a full analysis of this conflict of interest, one needs to
analyse the set of unitary transformations Alice is allowed
to perform under the protocol.
Unlike the first and second cases, if Bob’s measurement
does not fail, Eve will not share entanglement with either
Alice or Bob, since they discard their respective particles.
To evaluate the overall security of the protocol against
a type II attack, we now assume that Eve attacks L par-
ticle pairs. Since Alice and Bob check a random fraction
K ′/K of these pairs, the probability that Eve remains
undetected is approximately bounded above by p
LK′/K
0 —
the bound becomes exact in the limit of large K and K ′.
If Eve is not detected, the fraction e of key pairs she
shares with Alice and Bob is not greater than L/K. The
probability p(e) that Eve obtains a fraction e undetected
is therefore bounded above by peK
′
0 . The security of the
protocol against a type II attack then follows from the
fact that, for any e > 0, Alice and Bob can make p(e)
arbitrarily small by choosing K and K ′ sufficiently large.
Similarly, the protocol is secure against a type I attack
because the probability that Eve remains undetected in
a type I attack against L particle pairs is bounded above
by pL0 .
Conclusions and outlook. The quantum authentica-
tion protocol described above appears to be secure even
in the presence of an eavesdropper who has complete
control over both classical and quantum communication
channels at all times. Our protocol does not rely on clas-
sical cryptography. Furthermore, the security of the pro-
tocol does not depend on keeping classical information
secret, including information about quantum states: all
parties, including the eavesdropper, have full information
about all aspects of the protocol. In each authentication
round, additional quantum key particles are distributed
securely. Combined with entanglement purification and
privacy amplification techniques [DEJMPS], our proto-
col therefore also provides authenticated quantum key
distribution.
There is a number of important open questions which
we plan to address in the future. Most importantly, we
need to analyse the protocol in the presence of noise and
for more subtle eavesdropping attempts such as coherent
attacks, or an attack in which Eve partially entangles the
challenge with an ancillary particle. Furthermore, there
is scope for improving the protocol in several respects.
For instance, the parties should not have to discard all
key pairs if a single measurement fails. It should also be
possible to find states with a lower fidelity bound p0, e.g.,
by going to a higher-dimensional Hilbert space.
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